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EQUALITY UNDER THE LAW
MICHAEL J. HINDELANG
The author received his A.B. in psychology from Wayne State University in 1966, his M.A. in so-
cial psychology from the same institution in 1967. He also holds a 1968 master's degree in criminology
from the University of California (Berkeley), at which university he is presently a candidate for a
doctorate in criminology.
At the School of Criminology he has been affiliated with three research projects, the most recent of
which deals with drug use in the Haight-Ashbury section of San Francisco. His doctoral dissertation
concerns personality attributes of self-reported delinquents.
With increasing frequency the question has been raised as to whether or not defendants receive
differential judicial treatment as a function of their race. The present article reviews the empirical
studies that have addressed themselves to this question and attempts to reconcile their divergent
findings in the light of temporal, geographical, and methodological variability across studies.
On the facade of the Supreme Court building in
Washington, D.C., the words "Equal Justice
Under Law" stand out in large marble letters.
For many decades, but most noticeably in the last
decade, many have maintained that "Equal Justice
Under Law" is nothing but a facade for certain
segments of our population. Many critics1 have
put forth the hypothesis that justice in the United
States, as it has been and as it is still being ad-
ministered, is not free of bias. More specifically,
they have hypothesized that a significant minority
within our citizenry receives differential treatment
even within the context of the judiciary of the
United States. This minority is, of course, the
American Negro.
It has been maintained that equal justice for
Negroes, even under the law, has more often been
an ideal than a reality. More than three centuries
ago the Negro was brought to this country in a
position of subservience. Although many Negroes
have tried to raise themselves from this position,
they have been consistently and systematically
denied the opportunity in many spheres of activity.
The attempt to subvert the Negro's endeavor to
improve himself has not been undertaken solely by
the stereotypical southern bigot. Even among the
framers of the Constitution there were those who
preferred to see the Negro remain in a position of
social, economic, and political subordinance.
I Bullock, Significance of the Racial Factor in the
length of Prison Sentence, 52 J. Cam. L.C. & P.S.
411-17 (1961); Vines & Jacob, Studies in Judicial
Politics, in VIII TuLANE SrTurms N PouncAL
ScrENcE 77-98 (1963); LEMEiT & ROSENBERG, THE
AmINIsTRATION Or JUSTICE TO MiNORiTy GRouPs IN
Los ANGELES CouNTY (1948).
Miller points out that James Madison said that
it was "wrong to admit, in the Constitution, that
there could be property in man"; so the Constitu-
tion makes no mention of slaves, slavery, or race.
Yet the Constitution protected slavery in states in
which it existed. It provided for the return of
slaves to their masters, devised a formula for
counting slaves in the apportionment for members
of Congress, prohibited Congress from taxing
slavery out of existence, and preserved the African
slave trade for twenty years. Furthermore, the
slave trade and taxing clauses could not even be
amended before 1808.2 These provisions within the
Constitution are certainly dissonant with the
proposition upon which much of the American sys-
tem was founded-that "all men are created
equal".
In the 1857 case of Dred Scott v. Sanford, the
Supreme Court of the United States was given an
opportunity to delineate the civil status of the
Negro in America. Chief Justice Taney affirmed
that the Constitution was made by and for white
men. It was the opinion of his Court that Negroes
"were not intended to be included under the word
'citizen' in the Constitution, and can therefore
claim none of the rights and privileges which that
instrument provides for and secures to citizens of
the United States".' Nothing could have been
more clear. The Negro was not a citizen of the
United States, and consequently he had none of
the rights of the citizens of this country.
Within this same decision, the Supreme Court
2Miller, Race, Poverty, and the Law, 44 CA=E. L.
REv. 388 (1966).
3 Scott v. Sanford, 245 U.S. 197 (1857).
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further declared that it was the privilege and duty
of the separate states, rather than that of the
central government to legislate and enumerate the
civil rights of the Negroes within its boundaries.
Thus, the fate of the Negro was placed squarely in
the hands of the states.
Given these attitudes held by some of the
legislators (framers) and by at least a majority of
the Supreme Court in 1857, one need not strain to
understand how the Negro was relegated to the
role of a second-class citizen.
There were, however, many Americans who
disagreed with the Taney Court; there began a
movement, in effect, to reverse this state of affairs.
In 1865, less than ten years after the Dred Scott
decision, President Lincoln was instrumental in
bringing about the abolition of slavery.4 In the
following year, Congress drafted the Fourteenth
Amendment, and by 1868 three-fourths of the
states had ratified it.5 In effect, this amendment
was a reversal of the earlier Dred Scott decision.
It made former slaves citizens and gave them full
civil rights. Also, this amendment gave back to
the central government some of the powers that
the Dred Scott decision had given up to the states.
That is:
No State shall make or enforce any law which
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of
citizens of the United States; nor shall any
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor deny
to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.
0
Finally, in 1870, the Fifteenth Amendment pro-
claimed that the right of any citizen to vote could
not be abridged or denied because of race, color,
or previous condition of servitude.7
These three amendments removed the support
that the Constitution (and thus the nation) had
previously given to the proponents of slaves,
slavery, and racism. These amendments reversed
the interpretation of the Constitution that the
Supreme Court had earlier proclaimed concerning
the civil rights of Negroes. At this point every
American was constitutionally equal. Unfor-
tunately, however, the second-class stigma that
had come to be associated with the Negro was not
soon to be forgotten. Thirteen years of legislation
4 U.S. CoNsT. Amend. XIII.
5 Id. amend. XIV.
6 Ibi.
7 Id. amend. XV.
could hardly be expected to effectively blot out two
hundred years of precedent.
When the problem of the Negro in his quest for
equality is placed within this historical framework,
it is not at all difficult to understand his plight
today. It was much easier for the Civil War amend-
ments to reverse the law that had been laid down
by the Supreme Court thirteen years before than
it was for white Americans to reverse their tradi-
tional perceptions of the Negro inAmerican society.
For many of us this reversal has not even come
about one hundred years later.
In addition to being black, the Negro faces
another severe problem-he is also generally poor.
Any phenomenon that affects the poor as a group
will include a disproportionate number of Negroes
because a disproportionate number of Negroes live
below the poverty line in the United States.8
Being poor puts one at a distinct disadvantage
in any type of court action within the courts of the
United States. It is difficult, and sometimes impos-
sible, to be afforded true justice in the United
States without strong financial support. Beginning
with the very first steps in the judicial process, it
is necessary to have benefit of counsel if one expects
to be victorious. The intricacies and subtleties of
the law demand it. Even if one has expert knowl-
edge of the law, it may be unwise of him to under-
take his own defense. When Clarence Darrow, one
of the finest criminal lawyers in the history of the
United States, was being prosecuted for trying to
fix a jury, he immediately recognized the fact that
he needed a good lawyer. 9
As a defendant, the poor man is at an obvious
disadvantage. Often he does not have benefit of
counsel during the initial interrogation, 0 during
which many confessions are still made. Then he is
usually unable to post bail, so he is held in custody
pending trial. During this time he is unable to help
himself at all by doing the necessary sleuthing to
help to prove his innocence. He is likewise unable
to hire anyone else to act in his behalf. Finally, at
the trial, his attorney frequently is no legal match
for the experienced (or even the inexperienced)
prosecutor. If he is convicted by the judge or jury,
the defendant usually has a right to an appeal to a
8 Address by Lyndon Johnson, Howard University,
June 4, 1965, cited in Miller, supra note 2.
9 LEwis, GmEoN's TRumPET 171 (1964).
10 This is true at least in minor offenses, and often
in major offenses, in spite of the recent Court rulings.
See SKOLN cK, Jusnca WrmouT TRAL 145-47 (1966),
for an example of police circumvention of constitutional
requirements.
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higher court. However, if the defendant is unaware
of this right and he fails to appeal, the case goes no
further. Assuming that the defendant becomes
aware of his right to appeal, he may file for an
appeal. But in order to do this successfully, the
defendant must have some legal basis for an appeal.
Without legal assistance, it is unlikely that the
defendant will find legal grounds for an appeal.
And so, the financial status of the defendant can
be a determining factor in whether he is convicted
or acquitted.
Through the combined efforts of the judicial and
legislative branches of the governments on all levels
this inequity has begun to be remedied. In Betts v.
Brady" the Supreme Court, in 1942, decided that a
lawyer was constitutionally required only if to be
tried without one amounted to a "denial of funda-
mental fairness". To prove that he was denied
"fundamental fairness", the poor man had to
demonstrate that he was the victim of what the
Court called "special circumstances". These might
include his own illiteracy, ignorance, youth, or
mental illness, the complexity of the charge against
him, or the conduct of the prosecutor or the judge
at the trial."2 In this decision the Court made it
perfectly clear that this provision of counsel would
be made as a matter of right only in those cases
where "special circumstances" existed. After
twenty years of explaining and expanding these
"special circumstances", the Court finally, in 1963,
reversed itself in Gideon v. Wainwright." This
decision proclaimed that an indigent would have
access to counsel in state criminal trials. In the
1966 case of Miranda v. Arizona, 4 the Supreme
Court extended this provision to include the avail-
ability of counsel during interrogation. Through
Supreme Court decisions, the indigent defendant
is now in a position where he has the right to
counsel from the time he becomes a prime suspect"
through final appeal. Although the Court has not
clearly enumerated what types of offenses are to
be included in these decisions, the impact on the
legal profession is obvious.
This increased demand for legal services has
been met through the creation of public and private
defender systems; 6 and more recently through the
" Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 462 (1942).
1LEwis, op. cit. supra note 9, at 8.
"Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
1
4 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
Is Escebedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
1' BRowNELL, LEGAL Am IN TH UNITED STATES
126-34 (1951).
public-private system,17 which is privately admin-
istered but supported through both public and
private funds. In 1960 there were nearly twice as
many citizens with access to the services of a
Defender's office than there had been in the previ-
ous decade."8 Today an indigent, or a person of less
than adequate means, may qualify for legal aid
through the services of legal aid clinic, lawyer
referral plans, neighborhood law offices, public and
private defenders, and court assigned lawyers."
Although these recent developments have been
a giant step in the direction of equal justice for all,
regardless of economic class, the rich and the poor
defendant are still not afforded the same prob-
ability of being given equally harsh sentences. In
a study of 2,955 felony convictions in Detroit's
Recorder's Court,20 it was found that of those who
were able to make bail, 17% received prison sen-
tences while the remaining 83% received non-
prison sentences. (Non-prison sentences include
probation and probation with a brief jail sentence
at the beginning of probation.) Among those who
had not been able to make bail, 67.5% received
prison sentences while only 32.5% received non-
prison sentences (X2 = 683, p < .001).
These figures are somewhat confounded by the
fact that judges appear to set the bail higher in
cases where the state has a strong case (e.g., where
there were several witnesses, or the defendant was
caught in the act). Thus, the same set of circum-
stances that result in the bail being made more
difficult for the accused to make may also increase
the probability that he will be convicted. The
discrepancy is sufficiently large, however, to war-
rant further investigation of the hypothesis that at
least some of the disparity between the treatment
of offenders who had been able to make bail and the
treatment of those who had not been able to make
bail is the result of the differential economic status
of the defendants making up the two groups.
Further support for the hypothesis that the
relative wealth of the defendant may be a factor
which determines the harshness of the treatment
which is afforded him, is provided by another
finding in the Detroit study. It was found that of
17 Id. at 14.
18 Id. at 12.
29 MORELAND, EQUAL JusTicE UNDER LAW 74-77
(1957).
20 Saul R. Levin Memorial Foundation, Inc., Re-
port of Study of Recorder's Court over 20-month
Period, November 1, 1957 through June 30, 1959 (un-
published mimeograph).
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the defendants who had private counsel, 28%
received prison sentences while the remaining 72%
received non-prison sentences. On the other hand,
of those defendants who had court-appointed
counsel 57% received prison sentences and only
43% received non-prison sentences (X2 = 222, p
< .001). That is, a defendant who is unable to
secure private counsel is twice as likely to receive
a straight prison sentence as a defendant who is
able to secure private counsel. Since most juris-
dictions require that a defendant demonstrate his
indigence in order to obtain a court-appointed
counsel, the foregoing figures would seem to indi-
cate that poor defendants receive significantly
harsher sentences than those relatively less poor
defendants who are able to retain private counsel.
Since "being black" is so highly correlated with
being poor,2 it is impossible to appreciate the
magnitude of the Negro's plight in our courts
without being aware of the disadvantages of being
a poor defendant, for any conditions affecting the
poor will disproportionately affect the Negro.
Thus, the Negro is a victim of dual circumstances.
"He is poor and black in a world that is attuned to
the needs of the affluent and white".?2 Bearing this
in mind, let us examine some of the studies that
have tried to assess whether or not Negroes are
treated equally before the courts in the United
States.
Vines and Jacob,2n in their study of more than
4,000 cases dealt with by the court in Orleans
Parish (New Orleans), Louisiana, found an inter-
esting pattern of differential treatment afforded
white and Negro defendants. The authors used
two measures of harshness of treatment: dismissal
rate, and the percentage of offenders sentenced to
a year or more in prison. It was found that in 1954,
the year in which the Supreme Court took a giant
step in the direction of civil rights for the Negro,
defendants of both races received nearly equal
treatment at the hands of the judiciary. It was
found that discrepancies in the dismissal rates25 of
whites and Negroes accused of crimes had grown
steadily from an insignificant 1.6% in 1954 to
13.8% more dismissals for whites in 1958. This
discrepancy represents a significantly (p < .05)
21 Miller, supra note 2.
21 Id. at 392.
13 Vines & Jacob, op. clt-supra note 1, at 77-98.
24 Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
2 Dismissal rates represents the percentage of cases
in which the defendant has been charged and appre-
hended, but for some reason the prosecution discon-
tinues the action.
more harsh treatment of Negroes accused of crimes
in Orleans Parish in the sense that a greater per-
centage of Negroes had to face trial or punishment
(through'a plea of guilty) more frequently than
whites. When the percentage of defendants sen-
tenced to a year or more of prison for all crimes is
used as the dependent variable, a strikingly similar
pattern emerges. The discrepancies between the
percentages of Negro and white defendants sen-
tenced to a year or more in prison increased
monotonically from an insignificant 2.8% in 1954
to a significant 13.5% in 1960 (p < .05). However,
as the authors point out, if Negroes were com-
mitting more serious crimes than their white
counterparts, then more severe punishments would
be appropriate. An examination of specific cate-
gories of crimes "demonstrates that even when we
hold the offense-type constant, Negroes often
received heavier penalities than whites". Although
Negroes receive harsher treatment in 70% of the
categories examined, the authors unfortunately do
not provide any statistical test of the significance
of this finding.26
Several investigators have been interested more
specifically in whether differential treatment is
meted out not simply as a function of the race of
the offender, but as a function of the racial compo-
sition of the offender-victim dyad. The first of these
studies was carried out using court statistics avail-
able for murder indictments in North Carolina,
Georgia, and Virginia between 1930 and 1940.2 In
this study Johnson tested the hypothesis that the
order of severity of treatment by the court, from
most to least severe, would be as follows: (1)
Negro offender with a white victim (NW), (2)
white offender with a white victim (WW), (3)
Negro offender with a Negro victim (NN), (4)
white offender with a Negro victim (WN). The
rationale that he used for this prediction is that the
white power structure would be primarily con-
cerned with protecting white interests. Those in
power could not let the Negro get away with step-
ping out of line by daring to harm a white man; to
a lesser extent, whites who harmed whites also had
to be dealt with. If a Negro harmed a Negro
though, the white court was not likely to be overly
upset. Finally, if a white man harmed a Negro
there were likely to be extenuating circumstances;
the Negro may have "sassed" a white man or
"6 Vines & Jacob, op. cit. supra note 1, Tables 8, 9,
& 10.




"looked at" a white woman. For the 645 cases
examined the hypothesis was generally supported.
That is, when the percent convicted, the percent
receiving death sentences, and the length of sen-
tence are used as indicants, the order of severity of
treatment is that predicted: NW, WW, NN, WN.
Garfinkel,n using data for all homicides in
North Carolina between 1930 and 1940, improved
on Johnson's methodological approach by breaking
down murder into first and second degrees, as well
as by including manslaughters in the analysis and
using more dependent variables 9 on which to base
conclusions.
Garfinkel's analysis provides additional support
for Johnson's hypothesis. Virtually all independent
variablesr-indictment (the offense as it was de-
fined by the Grand jury in its "True Bill"), charge,
conviction rate, and severity of sentence--support
the general proposition that defendants in NW
cases are dealt with most harshly, followed by
WW, NN, and WN. For example, of those con-
victed of first degree murder, 54% of the defend-
ants in NW cases, 19% in WW cases, and 4% in
NN cases, and none of those in WN cases received
sentences of life imprisonment or death. Garfinkel's
is a much more compelling study than Johnson's.
The former uses a sample that is about 25% larger
than the latter's, and Garfinkel's tabular break-
downs of homicides by degrees, and his inclusions
of manslaughters provide a much more sophisti-
cated and precise argument in support of the
hypothesis being tested.
More recently, Bullock"0 has tested the hypothe-
sis that Negroes receive differential treatment in
our courts. In this study, however, the author
made the assumption that the crimes of murder
and rape are primarily intraracial and that the
crime ot burglary was interracial for Negro offend-
ers and primarily intraracial for white offenders
(i.e., the victims of burglaries are primarily white).
If the patterns of the murders examined by John-
son and Garfinkel in North Carolina, Virginia, and
Georgia are comparable to those in Texas, Bul-
lock's assumptions probably are not warranted in
about 10% of the cases. Bearing this limitation in
mind, let us examine the Bullock study.
Bullock analyzed data collected in 1958 from
2 Garfinkel, Research Note on Inter- and Intra-racial
Hominides, 27 SocIAL FoRces (1949) 369-81.
29Indictment, charge, and conviction percentages,
as well as the percentage of reductions in charges and
the length of sentences.
30 Bullock, supra note 1.
3,644 Negro and white prisoners at Texas State
Prison who had been committed for burglary, rape,
and murder. He found that several non-racial
factors exert an influence on the length of sentence
given. The factors that are among these are the
type of offense, the nature of the plea, and the
number of previous felonies. Bullock found that as
the Texas Penal Code directs, a significantly more
severe penalty (X2 = 522, p < .001) is given for the
crimes of murder and rape than for the crime of
burglary. In addition, those who plead guilty
receive significantly shorter sentences (X2 = 212,
p < .001) than those who plead not guilty. The
Penal Code, however, does not provide that this
factor should affect sentencing. Finally, the num-
ber of previous felonies has no significant effect on
the length of prison sentence. Besides these legal
factors, other non-legal factors affected the length
of sentence imposed.
It was found that those committed from East
Texas received significantly longer sentences (x2
= 20, p < .001) than those committed from West
Texas. It was also found that those committed
from "large city" counties (those having at least
one city of 50,000 or more population within its
boundaries) received significantly longer sentences
(X2 = 8.4, p < .01) than those committed from
"small city" counties.
Because of this inclination of juries to be in-
fluenced by these particular characteristics, those
possessing these characteristics will tend to receive
longer sentences than those not possessing them.
Bullock's data indicate that more Negroes than
whites fall into these categories for which juries
assess longer sentences. Thus even on the basis of
non-racial factors, Negroes are more likely to
receive more severe sentences than whites, simply
because they possess (to a much greater extent
than whites) the characteristics to which juries
assign stiffer sentences. However, even when these
non-racial characteristics are controlled, prisoners
receive differential treatment according to race.
Negro prisoners committed for murder received
significantly shorter sentences (x = 8.10, p <
.01) than their white counterparts, while those
Negroes imprisoned for burglary offenses received
significantly longer sentences (x2 = 14.45, p <
.001) than their white counterparts. Thus, to the
extent that we can accept Bullock's assumptions
concerning the race of the victims, his findings
indicate that NN murder cases are treated less
severely than WW murder cases, while NW bur-
[Vol 50
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glary cases are treated more severely than WW
burglary cases.
In their Homicide in an Urban Cominunity,";
Bensing and Schroeder examine 662 homicides that
occurred in the urban area of Greater Cleveland
between 1947 and 1954. In examining the offender-
victim dyads by race, Bensing and Schroeder found
that there were some rather striking differences in
the handling of Negro and white defendants in
intraracial cases. For example, far more Negroes
than whites (46% vs. 0%) are convicted as charged
in slayings involving a victim of the opposite race.
While disparities of this size are glaring, the
authors found by looking more deeply, that differ-
ences between Negro and white offenders probably
accounted for a major part of the discrepancy. For
example, among those convicted of first degree
murder, it was found that in 74% of the NW cases
the defendant was also facing "one or more felony
murder counts such as killing a police officer, killing
while perpetrating or attempting to perpetrate
arson, robbery, burglary, or rape. Since only intent
need be proved in felony murders, in theory, a
conviction should be easier to obtain than in cases
in which, in addition to intent to kill, premedita-
tion and deliberation have to be proved beyond a
reasonable doubt." 2 Differences in the circum-
stances of the NW as compared to the WN mur-
ders, and the fact that the disposition of the NN
and WW cases was strikingly similar led the
authors to conclude that there was no evidence of
racial discrimination.
Edward Green, in his study of Judicial Attitudes
In Sentencing,33 touches on the factor of race and
its effect on sentencing procedure in the criminal
court of Philadelphia. His data indicate that of
those sentenced (N = 333), Negro defendants
received significantly more severe sentences than
did white defendants (x = 20.5, p < .01). How-
ever, when the offense and the number of previous
felony convictions are held constant, there are no
significant differences in the severity of sentences
given to white and Negro defendants for burglary
(with no prior felony convictions, X2 = 1.0, p <
.80; with one or more prior felony convictions,
X = 4.9, p < .10), robbery (with one or no prior
felony convictions, X' = 1.1, p < .50), and theft
(with one or no prior felony convictions, x' = 2.8,
31 BENSING & SCHROEDER, HOMCIDE IN AN URA-N
CounuNioy (1960).
32Id. at 52.
3GRaEN, J Dic.AL ATnrm)Es TowARD SEENcING
56-63 (1961).
p < .30; with two or more prior felony convictions,
x2 = 5.9, p < .10).
In a more recent study, Green" argues that the
differences found in the treatment afforded white
and Negro offenders when the race of the victim
was also considered may have been due to racial
discrimination. He points out, however, that a
growing body of evidence more convincingly
indicates that:
differential treatment is a product of the sub-
cultural differences in patterns of crime result-
ing from enforced racial segregation. Rates of
the predominantly intra-racial offense of homi-
cide are consistently much higher for Negroes
compared with whites than can be accounted
for merely by discriminatory law enforcement
practices. The greater proneness of the Negro
to resort to violence in responding to slights or
settling disputes[ 51 coupled with a tendency
to carry "protective" weapons [6] subjects
him to a much greater risk than the white of
slaying or being slain in an intra-racial brawl.
There is commonly a quality of intimacy in the
relationship between the principals in an in-
group homicide; the slaying of a Negro by a
Negro is likely to be the culmination of an
altercation between friends, lovers, or spouses.
As Wolfgang points out in his discussion of
the role of the victim in precipitating his own
demise, the Negro victim much more fre-
quently than the white victim, has provoked
the slayer to assault him. Since the killing
which resolves such a conflict is rarely
premeditated, the legal element of "heat of
passion" is more apt to be present, and the
element of "intent to kill," problematic,
thereby mitigating the seriousness of the
offense.
The circumstances surrounding the NW
homicides, on the other hand, are conditioned
by the social distance which characterizes
race relations in the United States. The rela-
tively small percentage of interracial homicides
in empirical studies attests to the slight proba-
bability of a fatal clash between white and
34 Green, Inter- and Intra-Racial Crime Relative to
Sentencing, 55 J. Cumi. L.C. & P.S. 348 (1964).
3" Wolfgang & Ferracuti, Subculture of Violence, An
Interpretive Analysis of Homicide, 1962 INT'L ANNALS
or Can. 56.
3' Moses, Differentials in Crime Rates Between Negroes
and Whites, 12 Am. Soc. R.v., 411 (1947); Schultz,




Negro. [") A NW slaying is less likely than a
NN slaying to have arisen out of an alterca-
tion between intimates. Rather in most
instances the killing is an unpremeditated act
committed in the course of a predatory crime
such as robbery,R[3] thus automatically[391
elevating the offense to the level of first
degree murder.
40
Based on this reasoning, Green hypothesizes that
differences in the treatment of offenders attributed
to racial considerations by previous investigators,
will be accounted for by non-racial differences
among the four offender-victim categories for
which the statutes provide differential treatment.
Or, as Green puts it, the hypothesis is that
"patterns of criminal behavior constituting a given
offense differ intrinsically not only between the races
but within each race according to the race of the
victim and that such differences are legally sufficient
to account for the apparent racial differential in
sentencing." 4 Green's analysis shows that Negroes
with Negro victims are very different from Negroes
with white victims. The latter possess to a much
greater extent those attributes for which the
Pennsylvania statutes provide more severe
penalities. For example, the NW robberies when
compared to the NN robberies are more often
compounded by the fact that they are armed
robberies (61% vs. 13%), that they involve more
than one bill of indictment 42 (73% vs. 38%), and
that the defendant has prior convictions for robbery
or for felonies against the person (33% vs. 18%).
When the effects of these variables are partialled
out, a very different picture emerges. Although
Green uses no statistical tests, the observed mean
length of sentence is virtually identical to the
7 WOLFGANG, PATTERNs iN CarunArL HomcmE
(1958); Johnson, supra note 27; Garfinkel, supra note
28; BENSING & ScHROEDER, op. cit. supra note 31.
as In a study of homicide in Cleveland, Ohio, 20 out
of the 27 N-W first degree murder cases were fellony
murders. Bensing & Schroeder, op. cit. supra note 31.
To warrant a conviction of felony murder it is unneces-
sary to prove premeditation; proof of intent is sufficient.
39Th character of the white versus white homicides,
it is thought, would be likely to vary according to the
social class of the slayer and his victim. The lower class
pattern would correspond to the general run of the
NN slayings, crimes of passion predominating. The
middle class pattern would more often involve the
element of rational planning. See Wolfgang & Fer-
racuti, supra note 35.
40 Garfinkel supra note 28, at 349.
41 Green, supra note 34, at 349-50.
42 The number of Bills of Indictment is the number
of separate and unconnected offenses for which the
defendant is convicted. Id. at 350.
theoretical mean ("the value that would occur if
all cases of equivalent gravity, irrespective of race,
receive the same sentence") for the crimes of
robbery and burglary.43 Green's analysis strongly
argues that the variation in sentencing according
to the racial composition of the offender-victim
dyad exists as the result of legally relevant differ-
ences among the dyads, rather than as a result of
racial discrimination on behalf of the court.
Thus far, Vines and Jacob, Johnson, Garfinkel,
and Bullock have concluded that there is evidence
of racial discrimination in our courts, while Green
in two studies and Bensing and Schroeder have
concluded that there is no evidence of racial
discrimination in our courts. What are some of
the differences between those studies finding
negative evidence of racial discrimination and
those studies finding positive evidence of racial
discrimination that may account for the discrepant
findings? Let us briefly examine four of these
factors.
The four studies finding support for the hypothe-
sis that Negro offenders are treated differentially
used data collected from southern states-
Louisiana, North Carolina, Georgia, Virginia and
Texas; those studies finding no support for the
hypothesis used data collected from northern
states-Pennsylvania and Ohio. The implications
of this difference between those studies finding
support and those studies finding no support for
the hypothesis is obvious; stereotypical notions
of the differential treatment of Negroes in the
North vs. the South are sufficiently well-known to
warrant their absence from our present discussion.
Secondly, those studies finding no support for
the hypothesis generally exercised much more care
in controlling for relevant non-racial variables in
their analyses. Interestingly, before these relevant
non-racial variables were controlled, it appeared as
though the racial composition of the offender-
victim dyad were indeed exerting a significant
influence on the decision. However, after the effects
of some of the relevant non-racial aspects of the
offense were partialled out, the evidence of dis-
crimination disappeared. 44
A third difference between the first and second
groups of studies is that those studies finding
4
3Id. Tables 3 & 6.
44 Green, ibid., found for example, the number of
previous felonies, whether the robbery offenses were
armed or unarmed, and the bills of indictment, to be
relevant nonracial factors that influenced the severity
of the sentence administered.
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evidence of racial discrimination use data about
ten years older than those studies finding no
evidence of racial discrimination. Specifically,
Green's two studies use data on cases subsequent
to the 1954 Brown decision, while Johnson,
Garfinkel, and Bullock use data from cases, the
vast majority of which were decided prior to the
Brown decision."
Finally those studies finding support for the
hypothesis examined primarily homicides, while
those studies finding no support for the hypothesis
examined primarily property crimes."6
The dissonant findings of the two groups of
studies may be accounted for by geographical
and/or temporal considerations, in addition to
the types of crimes analyzed and/or the lack of
control of relevant non-racial variables. Although
Green's studies seem to have pretty well established
that in Philadelphia at least there is no evidence
of racial discrimination on the part of the court
within the crimes of burglary and robbery, more
4" There is one exception to this observation in each
group. Vines and Jacob, who found positive evidence,
used data for the years 1954-60. Bensing and Schroeder,
who found negative evidence, used data for the years
1947-53. It is possible that this may be accounted for
by the fact that the former used data from the South
while the latter used data from the North.
41 Again, the findings of Vines and Jacob and Bensing
and Schroeder are at odds with this observation.
empirical work needs to be done before conclusions
with respect to homicide in the North and South,
and property crimes in the South can be drawn
and a statement regarding the presence or absence
of racial discrimination on the part of the court
can be made. Green's finding that non-racial
variables may account for the apparent, though
perhaps artifactual, discrimination that the less-
controlled studies have unearthed has seriously
called into question the validity of the findings of
the earlier works. The wisest course of action would
seem to be to continue to study the problem,
controlling for the non-racial variables that Green
has found relevant, and searching for other
variables that may not be randomly distributed
among the offender-victim dyads.
If further analyses should indicate that discrimi-
nation on the part of the court does not exist, then
we should turn our efforts toward seeking equality
in more remote, but nonetheless essential spheres
of the adjudication process (e.g., providing compe-
tent lawyers and investigators for indigents). If,
however, inequities are uncovered in judicial
transactions, the court must resolve them so that
the rest of the nation and the world will have an
example of true equality on which to base indi-
vidual transactions.
